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Abstract:
The World Bank and Transparency International rank the Central Asian republics as highly 
corrupt.1 This opinion is shared by international media and by NGO personnel and academics 
working on the ground in these countries. Yet, the kind of practices that are labelled as 
“corrupt” by these observers seem much too diverse to meaningfully be covered by the same 
term, such as illicit selling and buying of government contracts at the highest level; tax evasion 
in the millions; the faster processing of a passport for a relative; and a taxi driver bribing the 
traffic police. This presents both an analytical and an ethical problem. This article argues that 
condemning discourses on corruption are often used by the powerful both nationally and 
internationally to dominate colonised and marginalised groups. Such groups, excluded from 
or exploited within formal structures, rely on networks and communities for their livelihoods. 
The upkeep of these social relations comes into conflict with the imperatives of state law 
and bureaucracy. Anti-corruption thus becomes a weapon of the strong against the weak 
and aligns with a long history of colonial tradition of domination and vilification of those 
“yet-to-be-civilised.” Its focus on regions of the Global South such as Central Asia marks a 
continuation of colonial legacy but also the region's continued marginality in the capitalist 
world system. This article posits that in order solve these analytical and ethical problems, 
we must be careful not to conflate a legal state-notion of corruption with a moral one thus 
accepting as default the perspective of the dominant groups running states and organisations.
Keywords: corruption, kinship, bureaucracy, Kyrgyzstan, Xinjiang, coloniality.
Introduction
The term of “corruption” is used to describe a wide range of very different practices that seem to 
share little beyond the label. It covers small scale bribing of traffic police, financial fraud in the 
millions, privileging friends or relatives for hiring, for tenders or for public services and resources 
along with various morally questionable behaviors. Haller and Shore see it as "a major theoretical 
challenge" to try to "theorize a phenomenon so polysemous and diffuse" (2005, p. 9). They question 
the term’s analytical usefulness but continue to use it as a generic term, as they see it as being 
"good to think with" (2005, p. 9; Zinn, 2005, p. 229). In this article, I seek to show that depending 
on who gets to define what corruption is and what falls under it, “thinking with” this concept 
will be good for some and bad for others. When corruption is defined by large international actors 
like the World Bank and United Nations in legalistic terms (i.e. in accordance with national state 
laws) but still retains connotations of immorality, then thinking with the term of “corruption” is 
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1      Knack, 2007; OECD, 2017; Transparency International, 2012; 2008; Urinboyev & Svensson, 2013, p. 373)
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What is legal is not always broadly regarded in society as moral and legitimate and what is illegal 
as immoral and illegitimate
Pardo, 2007, p. 125
Corruption is a word used pervasively to describe Russia and the former Soviet Union
Sievers, 2002, p. 101
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good for national and global elites – those understanding, upholding and writing the laws (Van 
Schendel & Abraham, 2005, p. 7) – and bad for the underpaid, marginalised and exploited. This is 
certainly the case for the many in southern Kyrgyzstan and southern Xinjiang – part of Central 
Asia, a region notorious for high levels of corruption – who rely on social networks for their 
livelihoods and do not have secure positions within the formal systems. The very institutions from 
which they are excluded or within which they are marginalised and exploited define corruption 
legalistically and use it against these population groups to dismiss them morally, by branding a 
large part of the conduct they build on for their survival as corruption. In order to understand this 
double bind between marginalisation and moral dismissal, I draw on ethnographic descriptions 
from several Central Asian contexts to suggest a heuristic distinction between two basic moralities 
deriving from two different logics: that of state-bureaucracy on the one side and that of kinship 
or relatedness on the other. State bureaucracy, the foundation of the formal systems, demands 
for all to be treated equally disregarding particular social relations – in the words of Max Weber, 
“without consideration of the person.” But these social relations and personal connections are 
the very essence of kinship- or relatedness organisation. This brings the two systems into conflict, 
which from the perspective of bureaucracy is deemed “corruption”, “tribalism” and “nepotism” 
and from the perspective of kinship can be seen as “disloyalty” or “treason.” My argument draws 
on critical works on corruption by Jeremy Morris and Abel Polese (2014), Rustamjon Urinboyev and 
Måns Svensson (2013), Cynthia Werner (2000), Caroline Humphrey (2012), Wilhelm Van Schendel 
and Itty Abraham (2005), Dieter Haller and Chris Shore (2005), David W. Lovell (2005), Susan Rose-
Ackermann (2010), Steven Sampson (2019) and others. What I seek to add is the development of 
a structural analytical tool to better grasp the circumstances under which people make their 
choices to carry out practices that are condemned as “corruption” by the formal systems. For 
many marginalised people in Central Asia, these practices constitute both an established way of 
being in the world and a rational mode of action given the social contexts they are a part of and 
the marginal and vulnerable positions they have within the capitalist world system.
This article is organised into two parts called “corruption” and “anti-corruption”. The first part, 
“corruption,” draws selectively on my own fieldwork data collected during research on local 
economic practices in southern Kyrgyzstan (for a total of 6 months in 2007, 2010, 2014 and 2016) 
as well as fieldwork in southern Xinjiang (for 21 months in 2010-2011, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016) 
for two different projects on kinship and cross-border trade respectively. It shows how certain 
practices, condemned as “corruption” from a legal state perspective, can be both rational and 
ethically sound choices for people with limited access to the formal systems and their resources. 
This is especially true in contexts like Central Asia where the population is highly vulnerable to 
the volatile fluctuations of the capitalist world system. In the second part, “anti-corruption,” I 
situate the Central Asian experience within the global multi-million-dollar anti-corruption industry 
(Sampson, 2010; 2019). The industry adopts a state perspective as an unreflected default to define 
corruption legalistically and judges it according to bureaucratic logics of morality. This definition 
opens the concept up to misuse by the powerful against the marginalised, as non-adherence to the 
formal system is in itself morally condemned. 
My conclusion is that in order to take local perspectives and the hardship of marginalised peoples 
at the fringes of the capitalist world system seriously, and avoid turning research into a tool 
for elites against the exploited, we must free it from the constrains of the state perspective and 
bureaucratic morality. Therefore, we need to distinguish legalistic notions of corruption from 
moralistic ones and allow for a local, non-bureaucratic understanding of morality. Legalistic 
definitions of corruption that define as corrupt what transgresses the law and formal systems 
must be clearly distinguished from moral definitions that see as “corrupt” practices that are 
deemed wrong by a given local population, even when some of these practices (such as lobbyism, 
exploitation and tax avoidance) are formally legal. 
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Corruption
Corruption in Central Asia
Corruption has often been described as a widespread phenomenon in Central Asia.2 The few 
international media outlets that report on the region with any regularity show a pronounced 
interest in high-profile corruption cases. Then-president of Kyrgyzstan Almasbek Atambaev's 
involvement in the disappearance of millions of dollars for a Chinese managed modernisation of 
Bishkek Thermal Power Station in 20133; late Uzbek president Islam Karimov's daughter's sentence 
for corruption4; the involvement of Kyrgyz top customs official Raimbek Matraimov in money 
laundering and tax evasion5 have all been extensively discussed. The national presses in Central 
Asia, too, regularly cover corruption scandals that have brought down politicians of all levels 
within the last two decades.6 Bribing and nepotism are recurring topics at the bazars and tea 
houses I have frequented in southern Xinjiang and Kyrgyzstan, where locals share their experiences 
involving customs officers, traffic police, bazar authorities, university administration and local 
government officials (cf. Humphrey, 2012; Haller & Shore, 2005, p. 6). In the Kyrgyz part of the 
Ferghana Valley, Uyghur, Chinese and Uzbek traders I talked to lamented the excessive bribing and 
therefore preferred to handle their affairs through social connections rather than via the official 
bureaucratic paths whenever possible. 
Both governments and large international organisations promote anti-corruption as a top priority 
in their efforts to develop the region. In 2015, local state media in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region (PRC) announced that more than 700 local state officials had been charged with corruption 
(VoA 2015). This was the beginning of a long-standing purge of local minority elites by the CCP, 
during which much land, resources, labour and market shares were secured by Han-Chinese 
companies close to the government (Steenberg & Rippa, 2019). In 2017-2019, during the mass 
incarceration of hundred thousands of Uyghurs and Kazakhs for deviant ideological or religious 
attitudes, hundreds of intellectuals and state officials from minority backgrounds were sentenced 
to long prison terms for alleged corruption, including bribe taking and embezzlement of funds 
(UHRP, 2018; 2019). Elsewhere in China, too, officials critical of Xi Jinping’s party line, too closely 
involved with his critics and rivals or belonging to national minorities, have been charged with 
corruption more frequently than others. Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan most politicians sentenced over 
corruption have belonged to the opposition.7
 
It seems that in Xinjiang and Kyrgyzstan almost anyone from a non-dominant group of the population 
(opposition politicians, minorities, women) could at any time be charged with “corrupt” practices 
in one form or another – be it bribery, fraud, favoritism or simply running unregistered businesses. 
This most certainly has to do with a degree of “selective justice” and “ruling regimes in Central 
Asia [using] corruption as a mechanism of direct and indirect administrative control” (Osipian, 
2009, p. 183). Yet, often the charges, while unfairly brought against some and not others, are not 
entirely made out of thin air. My own fieldwork data and further anecdotal evidence suggest that 
a large part of the local population in Xinjiang, Kyrgyzstan actually engages in activities that can 
be deemed “corrupt” from a legal state perspective. The prevalence of corruption in both discourse 
(Gulette, 2010) and practice is much noted by scholars on the region. Ararat Osipian concludes, 
“corruption [in Central Asia] has a systemic character, it is endemic to the society, and it has 
reached epidemic proportions” (2009, p. 198). Why do people engage in such activities that are 
against the law? Especially when it makes them so vulnerable to persecution by the ruling elites? 
To explain this, scholars of Central Asia and other post-Soviet contexts adduce a range of factors, 
including the Soviet legacy (Lovell, 2005; Luong Jones, 2002; Ledeneva, 1998); particularly dishonest 
2      Leach, 1999; OECD, 2017; Osipian, 2009, p. 182; Shleifer & Treisman, 2003; Transparency International, 2008
3      AKIPress, 2019; EurasiaNet, 2019
4      OCCRP, 2015, Putz, 2020; RFE/RL, 2020
5      BellingCat, 2019; OCCRP, 2019
6      Gulette, 2010; UHRP, 2018, 2019; VoA, 2015
7      Prominent examples are Tekebaev during the rule of Atembaev and Beknazarov during the rule of Akaev.
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politicians (Ledeneva, 1998, pp. 42-43); the systemic lack of resources in post-Soviet Central Asia 
(Humphrey, 2002); unfettered rent-seeking in a disembedded, un-enlightened capitalist system 
(Pétric, 2005); and established traditional patterns and a culture of gift giving (Werner, 2000; Pétric, 
2002). The three latter explanations hold aspects important for this article's analysis. It takes its 
departure from the notion of gift giving, not merely as an established tradition or a “remnant,” but 
also as a choice and rational course of action.
Bribes or gifts
Gift giving is often invoked by anthropologists as a contrasting notion to “bribes” to point to a 
discrepancy between what is officially regarded as corruption and what the local people in Central 
Asia and beyond see as morally wrong (Lovell, 2005, p. 70; Polese, 2008; Urinboyev & Svensson, 
2013, p. 372; Werner, 2000, pp. 16-17, p. 20).8 Pardo asserts, “corruption may help to maintain social 
bonds and to engender new ones,” (2013, p. 142) while “Rose-Ackerman [...] considers corruption 
as an ‘allocative mechanism’ for scarce resources” (Osipian, 2009, p. 183). The imprecision of these 
formulations is telling: of course, it is not “corruption” which maintains social bonds or allocates 
resources. This is done through practices that are first and foremost gifts given or acts of support 
and only secondarily become labeled as “corruption” by governments, statisticians, organisations 
and scholars. These practices are not primarily “corruption” for the people who practice them 
but ways to fulfil kinship obligations, express loyalty and solidarity with one’s community and 
secure the household’s livelihood and future. Humphrey (2002, p. 128), Werner (2000, pp. 16-20), 
Polese (2014), Haller and Shore (2005) and other anthropologists explicitly call for interrogations 
into the cultural specifics of such practices. To dismiss them as corruption “does not correspond 
to the differentiated practice and discourse of the people themselves” (Humphrey, 2002, p. 128, 
see Polese, 2008, p. 47). As Haller and Shore (2005, p. 9) put it, “what is classified as nepotism 
and cronyism in Scandinavia, may well be regarded as a moral duty to help one’s friends and 
family in parts of Asia and Africa – or indeed, among sections of France’s classe politique.” Others 
show how practices categorised by some as corruption may be the only way to escape unjust 
persecution; to rightfully access resources (Gullette, 2010, p. 42); to make ends meet or even to 
survive (Polese, 2008; Urinboyev & Svensson, 2013, p. 372) within dysfunctional bureaucracies and 
exploitative markets. Therefore, if some practices deemed “corrupt” by the state and international 
organisations can be seen as legitimate reactions to systems of injustice or normal social practices 
of relationships essential to the functioning of society, to condemn them morally is akin to a 
blanket and uncritical acceptance of the perspective of the state and of the ruling elites defining 
national laws (Van Schendel & Abraham, 2005, p. 7) as being universal.
Lovell provides a structural approach that acknowledges the multiplicity of perspectives. He 
makes an argument for seeing the “endemic corruption” in Central Asia as a phenomenon of 
transition from one system to another, caused by the lingering of “significant patterns of informal 
and traditional behaviours that affect the relations between public officials and citizens” (2005, p. 
79). According to Lovell, “tensions exist between the different types of social relationship which 
are assumed by traditional and modern forms of ruling” (p. 79). It becomes obvious what type of 
simplifications Lovell is writing against when he adds, “officials in transitional regimes should not 
be regarded as intrinsically evil or culturally predisposed to corruption” (p. 79). Lovell captures 
the systemic tensions between kinship loyalties and gift giving on the one side and the demands 
of anonymous state bureaucracy on the other (p. 78). In spite of this insight, he does not proceed 
to call out the inherently state-centric perspective of the concept of “corruption” (Van Schendel 
& Abraham, 2005, p. 6), nor does he question its legitimacy or analytical usefulness as a generic 
term. Instead he calls for a “profound change in society and culture” (Lovell, 2005, p. 70) in Central 
Asia and the “development of a strong civil society” (p. 79) to ease this tension. By identifying the 
8      The choice to focus on the distinction between gifts and bribes is no coincidence but potentially misleading. As brib-
ing follows the logic of commodity exchange (a transaction of alienable things between uninterested actors), it is the form 
most familiar and easily accessible to western scholars and audiences and as a commercial transaction most easy to dismiss 
morally, because it does not compromise any relationships. Yet, besides bribing, other “corrupt” practices include various 
forms of nepotism that follow the logic of “gifts” (the transaction of inalienable things between interested actors), where the 
transaction is entangled in long-term social relations. It is far from a given that local judgement would morally dismiss all the 
commodity-type transactions while accepting those following a gift-logic.
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problem and seeking the solution within society in a context of the Global South, Lovell’s analysis 
remains within the ideological bounds of mainstream western, state-centric, colonial notions of 
corruption.
Bureaucracy versus kinship
To escape the epistemological bounds of this ideology and to acknowledge the “limits of ‘seeing 
like a state’,” Van Schendel and Abraham suggest to “adopt [...] analytic perspectives that privilege 
the participants” (2005, pp. 6-7). They invite us to view the tension between the state perspective 
and that of ordinary people in Kyrgyzstan and Xinjiang engaged in activities deemed corrupt by the 
state, from a non-state, local side. This perspective defines a constitutive branch of anthropological 
theory: Kinship anthropology has for more than a century focussed on the study of non-state social 
organisation. Georg Pfeffer (2016) defines kinship in explicit opposition to bureaucracy and the 
state, as a non-state, non-bureaucratic form of constitution for the ordering of society. Pfeffer's 
approach helps us arrive at the core of the tension of “corruption” by allowing us to distinguish 
between two moralities based in two different logics: that of state-bureaucracy on the one side 
and that of kinship or relatedness (Carsten, 2000) on the other. Practices seen as “corrupt” within 
one are not merely tolerated within the other, but imperative and constitutive to it. It may seem 
strange to suggest that kinship should stand in opposition to the law or state and generally it does 
not, but the primary loyalties claimed by bureaucracy and those of kinship directly contradict each 
other in significant ways. The core premises of these two logics stand in opposition to each other 
in ways I shall now venture to draw up by describing, in brief. 
According to Max Weber, bureaucracy means organisation and administration “ohne Ansehen der 
Person” (without consideration of the person) (Weber, 1922/1972, p. 563). This calls for identical 
treatment of any one person by the system and its servants. Social relations to the administrator 
or any other person may not have any effect on this interaction, which is done purely according to 
predetermined categories for the individual (gender, age, place of registered residence, registered 
marital status, etc.). This is the realm of the formal, legal and – from a state perspective – legitimate. 
It is extended beyond state bureaucracy to regulated, non-state institutions such as private 
companies and NGOs, where paperwork makes these institutions accessible to bureaucratic 
control. This is meant to ensure that their hiring, handing out of contracts and many aspects of 
their daily workings follow legal principles that exclude the consideration of personal relations.
Kinship, on the other hand, is based on the exact opposite premise. Here the consideration of 
the person and her personal relations are the key organising principle. While kinship in parts of 
modern, western ideology has been reduced to little but the nuclear family and a notion of genetic 
descent (Carsten, 2004), in most social contexts globally and historically it extends way beyond 
this narrow bound and is defined by social interaction rather than by biology (Sahlins, 2013). In 
this anthropological sense, kinship (or relatedness; Carsten, 2000; 2004) includes communities 
and all other forms of long-term social relationships based on mutual obligation. Much of what 
kinship terminology, rituals and gift giving9 does, is exactly to define such obligations between 
people in terms of authority, labour, emotional and material support (Hardenberg, 2009; Pfeffer, 
2016). Kinship is all-pervasively involved in the ordering of both economic, political and affective 
relations and is based on the exact opposite principle to that of modern state bureaucracy, with 
which it has shared and contested social organisational roles for centuries (see Pfeffer, 2016; 
Sabean, 1998, Sneath, 2009; Steenberg, 2017).10
9      Marcel Mauss, who is mentioned by several anthropologists writing about corruption (Polese, 2008; Werner, 2000), ex-
plicitly draws a parallel between kinship and gift giving on the one side and state law on the other. In his “Essay on the Gift” 
(1990/1924), he sees "total" social institutions of gift giving and reciprocity as precursors to state law. While the evolutionist 
undertones of this argument must be criticised, what remains valid is the functional parallel of state law and social obligations 
of gift giving. Gift giving must be understood as part of a wide range of kinship based practices to organise both the circula-
tion of things, labour and social relations. These practices are important elements in the social structure including kinship, 
communities and networks.
10      Structures of kinship and gift giving have at times in history been the dominant type of social organisation in Central 
Asia. In the past century, it has ceded many areas to state law (Scott, 2009), bureaucracy (Graeber, 2016; Pfeffer, 2016), and, 
more recently, the state protected capitalist market (cf. Kalb, 2013).
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The areas of overlap, interaction and conflict between these two logics and moralities, are where 
legalistic discourses of corruption come into existence. It is important to point out that these are 
discourses focussed on the types of corruption that involve an element of “relations”, “connections” 
or “nepotism” and their locally specific expressions like “tribalism” in Kyrgyzstan (Gullette, 2010), 
compadres in Mexico and Brazil (Lanna, 2007) blat in Russia (Ledeneva, 1998) and guanxi/renqing 
in China (Yan, 1996). They are less concerned with practices of “pure bribing” where a service is 
illegally “purchased” without any social relation being envoked or constructed akin to exchanges 
on a commodity market (cf. Gregory, 1982). These legalistic discourses are framed by a common, 
international episteme around “nepotistic corruption,” in which a practice is deemed “corrupt” 
because it transgresses the bureaucratic, legalistic logic and then deemed morally wrong because 
it is “corrupt.” Corruption in this sense has become a marker of the tension between kinship and 
bureaucracy seen from the perspective of bureaucracy (i.e. the state and law) – the manifestation 
of derogatory judgements over kinship in terms of bureaucracy. Opposite narratives expressing a 
derogatory view on bureaucratic conduct from the perspective of kinship are those of “disloyalty”, 
“treason”, “egotism”, “selling out,” “forgetting one’s roots and duties” or “the colonisation of life-
worlds” (Habermas, 1981). The tensions between these two logics and their ethics affect the lives of a 
high number of people in Central Asia and other contexts of the Global South. 
Alternative strategies
Almost all families and individuals I have been involved with in Kyrgyzstan and Xinjiang to some degree 
navigate between formal structures that follow the state laws and bureaucratic logic and structures of 
social relations that follow rules of kinship and community. From the perspective of local actors, these 
structures present alternatives for investment of time and resources. Households and individuals 
more or less consciously follow strategies that stress one or the other. This translates into a number 
of concrete choices like whether the family savings (or the potential for borrowing from relatives) 
is used to send a daughter off to university or on a large wedding for her; or whether to employ a 
formally well-qualified professional into the family business or a brother’s son. Each have undeniable 
advantages and risks, the result of which depends on a number of factors – including the structural 
position of the household in the formal economy and changing macro-economic circumstances.
Madeleine Reeves (2012, pp. 122-123) introduces Jengesh from Batken in southern Kyrgyzstan. He 
complains that his former classmates who performed badly in school have become successful 
traders and labour migrants to Russia, able to afford cars and marry, while he, who always had 
the highest grades and went on to earn a university degree ended up unemployed and indebted. 
Jengesh chose to invest his time and effort into the formal educational system and his family 
provided the funds for him to study, but this investment did not pay off as he had hoped or been 
promised. His underperforming classmates, on the other hand, did not invest much into formal 
education. They went to Russia as labour migrants or engaged in the border trade, which demand 
the dedication of time and resources into so-called informal structures and the social networks 
behind them. Many of them had considerable success. The way Jengesh invested his time and 
effort, probably encouraged by teachers and family members, follows the recommendations of 
modernist state narratives — both Soviet and post-Soviet — and most international development 
agencies (see Amsler, 2009). They give high priority to formal education, formal licensing and 
other fields of interaction with anonymous structures of state bureaucracy and regulated markets. 
The same institutions encourage borrowing money from banks instead of from relatives and 
condemn “wasteful spending” of money and time on social events like weddings where the type 
of networks are forged that Jengesh‘s former classmates needed for their successful endeavours in 
Russia. The actual economic context of Kyrgyzstan in the early 2010s, during Jengesh’ initial adult 
years, awarded the investment into such networks higher than that into formal education. The 
state and formal market structures, upon which Jengesh made his success dependent, failed to 
deliver the opportunities they had promised. In 1991, the Kyrgyz economy entered at the margins 
of a capitalist world system. Kyrgyzstan followed the World Bank recommendations of “Shock 
Therapy” but hardly saw it pay off and never advanced within the global economic hierarchy. This 
continues to translate into low wages and earnings with comparatively high costs of living. In a 
similar setting in Uzbekistan, Urinboyev and Svensson (2013, p. 385) describe the midwife Umida 
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who defends accepting illegal money gifts from the families of women giving birth. She points out 
that this is her only way to profit from the seven years she invested into her studies, as her salary 
does not cover her living expenses. Morris and Polese quote similar legitimations for taking illegal 
payments by workers in the Ukrainian health sector (2014, p. 10). 
Between 2010-2014, I met several young Uyghurs from rural Atush in XUAR who pursued similar 
strategies as Jengesh’s classmates. Paying little heed to formal education, they spent much of 
their time at the bazaar engaged in petty trade only to use their meagre profits to play pool in 
the local billiard hall on the 2nd floor of an empty, run-down factory building and invite each 
other for lunch despite food being prepared for them by their families at home. Their interactions 
of mutual support and displays of generosity were meaning-building activities carrying value in 
themselves, but they also constituted investments into social networks upon which their economic 
future depended. Much like gift giving at weddings, their exchanges more or less consciously 
aimed to build social capital. One day, three of them came to visit me in Kashgar where I was 
conducting long-term fieldwork. We walked around town talking of weddings and the harvest and 
I was initially surprised at how lightly and carelessly they spent their scarce money on random 
entertainment and cheap plastic toys. Just before returning home, they asked me to borrow some 
money and bought a large box of melons. They took it back to Atush and sold it for a profit on 
the local farmers’ market. The next day they returned to repay me and repeat the deal, but this 
time they were less fortunate. Some of the melons had been damaged and they lost almost all of 
their profit from the first deal. The meagre rest of it they spent on a common meal to which I was 
also invited at a restaurant run by one of their friends’ family. They were excited and regarded the 
endeavour a success. It took me a while to realise that it was a success, not in profit-making, but 
in smoothly managing social relations and solidifying trust and connections. They were building 
both social and cultural capital in the sense of negotiating concrete relations and building their 
networking and business skills.
These social networks and the skills required to establish and uphold them are of particular 
importance for poor and educationally underprivileged families, especially those from 
discriminated populations such as the Uyghurs in China who are given few chances to succeed 
in the formal systems. Connections and trust are crucial in trade, which provides one of the few 
options available for Uyghurs from rural backgrounds to establish themselves in society, to make a 
living but also a name for themselves – to be someone. These young men successfully invest their 
time hanging out, practicing generosity and thereby cultivate a mind-set to prioritise long-term 
social relations over the demands of formal structures or short-term market gains. A similar logic 
and experience leads them and many others in Central Asia to not regard large weddings a waste 
of time and money, but rather an essential option for investment into personalised social networks 
on which future economic success and social security depend along with social recognition and 
meaning-creation in life. 
The volatility of formal structures
Such networks and other so-called informal structures are often viewed with suspicion by the 
state for very similar reasons to why bureaucracies feel threatened by kinship. They cultivate 
loyalties that may compromise state laws, they are not controlled or legible, and the economic 
activities taking place in them are rarely registered, meaning that they do not produce state 
revenue or figure in the growth statistics. Formalisation processes have been a central feature 
of PRC modernisation efforts in Xinjiang since the late 1990s. This has plunged a large part of 
southern Xinjiang’s Uyghur population into the vulnerable process of moving from livelihoods 
strongly based on social networks to such based more on formal structures. It has happened both 
under government coercion and more voluntarily – lured by the comforts of a modern life and the 
promises of development. It has also been a consequence of the whole environment becoming 
more formalised and regulated as a result of targeted state campaigns. The results have been more 
priority to formal education and registered employment; more regulated markets; an increase 
in the use of banks and insurance, and stricter taxation. It has also led to a reduction in ritual 
activities; a decrease in systems of unpaid labour help and the (often forceful) dismantling of old-
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established neighbourhoods and communities (Bellér-Hann, 2013; Kobi, 2016; Steenberg & Rippa, 
2019). This process has entailed risks and losses, but also improvements of material livelihoods 
and comfort for many. Importantly for the argument of this article, it has led more people to 
depend more heavily on the formal systems: trusting (or at least hoping) that that markets and 
the state will sufficiently accommodate for their future needs, that the time and resources spent 
on education will result in employment and that, in case of illness or other difficulties, state social 
security and formal insurances will protect them.
Between 2010 and 2014, there was reason to believe that this would be the case. The economy 
in southern Xinjiang was growing, trade was flourishing, government investment enhanced the 
availability of money and of people entering into the commercial economy at an unprecedented 
velocity kept opportunities expanding. This changed in 2014 as the impact of the Global Financial 
Crisis came to be felt more severely in China and Central Asia, and the government enhanced the 
security regime in Xinjiang (Roberts, 2020; Steenberg & Rippa, 2019).Targeted by the securitization 
and being the most vulnerable and the lowest in the hierarchy of a slowing economy, Uyghurs 
were increasingly excluded from the formal public and private sectors. As a result, a large part 
of the population slipped beneath the line of neutral returns regarding the formal systems. 
They had lost more than they had gained from focussing on formal education and employment. 
Like in Jengesh’s Kyrgyzstan and Umida’s Uzbekistan, as the promised schemes failed to deliver, 
vulnerability translated into precariousness and marginalisation, which resulted in alienation and 
progressive loss of faith in the state, its laws and its project of modernisation.
I observed the devastating effects of such a formalisation effort without locally sustainable 
development with particular clarity over several years at the Irkeshtam border between Xinjiang 
and Kyrgyzstan in the early 2010s. When I crossed the border repeatedly in 2010 and 2011, I found 
a flourishing and growing settlement of restaurants, lodgings, supermarkets, repair shops, 
moneychangers and other services. The road on the Chinese side was much better than that on 
the Kyrgyz side, which could not carry the heavy Chinese trucks. Therefore, everything had to 
be reloaded onto smaller vehicles arriving from Osh. In sync with growing trade, the settlement 
on both sides of the border experienced an increase of opportunities for local service providers. 
Families from the surroundings pooled their income to invest into shops, hotels and service 
stations for drivers and traders. On the Chinese side, this was encouraged and supported by the 
local authorities. When I crossed again in 2013, Chinese construction companies had significantly 
improved the road on the Kyrgyz side with Chinese funding. Now large trucks were rolling through 
from Kashgar to Osh and the border towns had lost their significance, income and a large part 
of their population. They had become half-empty and shops were struggling to stay in business. 
In 2016, the situation had deteriorated further. Few stores were left, many of the structures had 
collapsed, some streets had been completely abandoned and heaps of debris and trash including 
scores of worn out car skeletons littered what had only five years earlier been a thriving border 
town. To standardise, ease, and better control the customs procedures, the Chinese authorities 
had moved their customs control 100 kilometres to the east from the border to the nearest town, 
Ulughchat, half way to Kashgar. This had made it difficult to enter the area west of the town even 
for its residents and local business was no longer profitable. Many of those who had pooled or 
borrowed money to invest in this border town had incurred heavy losses, were in debt and some 
were forced to sell their land and leave the region.
These examples of formal structures not delivering are no exceptions, as other studies have clearly 
shown (Morris & Polese, 2014; Reeves, 2012; Urinboyev & Svensson, 2013). Hasan Karrar describes 
how modernisation efforts at Sost dry port in Gilgit-Baltistan at the Chinese border similarly led to 
the near exclusion of locals from the trade; the very people who had been encouraged to support 
and invest their hopes into the expansion of the dry port few years earlier (Karrar, 2020, p. 35). 
These dynamics are characteristic of social contexts at the margins of the capitalist world system 
such as southern Kyrgyzstan and southern Xinjiang – precisely the types of places known for 
corruption and targeted in large national and international anti-corruption campaigns.
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Anti-corruption
The anti-corruption industry 
According to Steven Sampson, the “anti-corruption industry” was established in the 1990s. In 1993, 
Transparency International had been founded by former World Bank official Peter Eigen, and three 
years later World Bank president James Wolfensohn gave a speech in which he blamed much of 
the lack of development in the Global South on what he called the “cancer of corruption” and laid 
out new conditions for international loans requiring reforms toward what he deemed “effective 
government” (Sampson, 2010, pp. 273-274; 2019, p. 277). Framed by the context of globally 
accelerating neo-liberal politics, this industry came to span most large international governing 
bodies such as the UN, OECD and EU as well as a myriad of NGOs, establishing “anti-corruption 
initiatives, budget lines, agencies and programs, anti-corruption conferences and training, 
anti-bribery investigations, corruption diagnostics and surveys, an ISO anti-bribery standard, 
and even Master’s degrees and certification in corruption and governance studies” (Sampson, 
2019, p. 281). Western governments and international development agencies were looking for 
endogenous factors on which to blame more than 45 years of failed trickle-down development 
strategies (Werner, 2000, p. 20) and seeking to influence the laws in many “developing countries”. 
Unsurprisingly, the academic community broadly followed their lead and funding to devote much 
research to the topic (Lovell, 2005, p. 65; Haller & Shore, 2005; Werner, 2000, p. 16). Anti-corruption 
became a good business opportunity for NGOs, political and academic institutions and other “so-
called moral entrepreneurs” (Sampson, 2019, p. 278, p. 284). The political bias of the industry 
determined its main focus to be government practice in the Global South while largely ignoring 
financial fraud and “culturally accepted forms of corruption, such as campaign ‘donations’”, 
lobbyism and tax evasion in the Global North (Werner, 2000, p. 20). Here, corruption such as that 
evidenced in the Paradise Papers, the Panama Papers and in cases involving FIFA, Volkswagen, 
Deutsche Bank, Nissan and a range of other firms and organisations listed on WikiLeaks is reduced 
to individual vice or euphemistically dismissed as “conflict of interest” or “bad management” 
(Sampson, 2019, p. 282), and corporate financial fraud is rarely persecuted but rather settled out of 
court (Greaber, 2015, pp. 25-26). This suggests that the anti-corruption campaigns were primarily 
about “protecting the investments of Western-dominated transnational corporations” and helping 
them “avoid the hassle of unfamiliar business practices” rather than fighting social injustices 
(Werner, 2000, p. 20). The more or less subtle use of anti-corruption as a “civilising mission” to 
open up new markets in the Global South and shape the legal frameworks around them to the 
needs of Western companies, is exemplified in embarrassing clarity by the title of a 2006 issue of 
Development Outreach, a journal published by the World Bank, "Fighting Corruption: Business as 
a Partner" and in a World Bank Special Report on Corruption in Central Asia which recommends 
that: 
"countries with particularly high levels of state capture should focus more on enhancing 
political accountability and promoting greater competition in the economy through 
demonopolization and the entry of new firms." (Gray et al., 2004, p. 32)
Under the financial and political pressure of such large organisations, anti-corruption programs 
have been initiated in many former east-block countries. In Georgia after the Rose-Revolution in 
2003, “all the social, economic, and political problems [...] were framed as problems related to the 
prevalence of corruption and informality” (Rekhviashvili, 2015, p. 4). The resulting anti-corruption 
reforms did reduce low-level corruption, which improved the quality of government institutions 
according to the indicators of the World Bank, and the country’s GDP grew (2). Yet, the campaigns 
also resulted in rapidly growing rates of poverty, undernourishment and inequality, as “the post-
revolutionary government used the anti-corruption discourse to get rid of social responsibilities, 
outsource and privatize a large portion of public services, and remove entire state departments, 
services and institutions” (3). Similar developments have been described in Romania in the 
early 2010s, when anti-corruption campaigns were employed to push austerity measures and 
privatisation and supported the “fight of big capital against local capital” (Rogozanu, 2014, p. 2). As 
described above in the cases of Xi Jinping and the mass incarcerations in Xinjiang and persecuted 
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Kyrgyz politicians, anti-corruption is also often used by national elites to exploit local populations, 
gain access to land or purge opposition or minorities. They use formalisation and the expansion 
of bureaucracy which they control through state institutions to dismantle and fragment the less 
controllable rival forms of organisation.
The colonial history of anti-corruption
“Corruption” is not the first or only trope to be employed by global and national elites to legitimise 
violent forms of control. In the 1970s, concerns with lack of progress in “developing countries” 
sparked political and scholarly debates around “patronage” and “clientelism” as hindering factors 
that resemble debates on corruption (Werner, 2000, p. 16; Haller & Shore, 2005, p. 9). They were 
particularly concerned with development in South America where the US government was heavily 
involved, and these concepts became the neo-liberal establishment’s preferred endogenous-factor-
explanation11 to oppose the leftist dependencia-approach and its focus on external factors – most 
especially the global division of labour and the exploitation of weaker countries by colonial and 
post-colonial powers – as the main cause of underdevelopment. 
In a similar vein, Russian and Soviet colonising regimes blamed what they saw as a lack of progress 
in Central Asia on “backward,” “tribal” and “corrupt” local traditions. They used these discourses 
to legitimise the violent suppression of indigenous customs (Martin, 2001) and local resistance to 
colonisation. State campaigns around such rationale occurred repeatedly during Czarist expansion; 
Soviet collectivisation; the Stalinist purges of the 1930s; the 1980s’ campaigns aimed at eliminating 
the so-called "Uzbek disease" of corruption12 and during the Western-led “transformation” efforts 
after 1991. Discourses condemning “corruption” or “tribalism” today are thus part of a centuries 
long tradition of coloniality13 (Tlostanova, 2012; Mignolo, 2011) and efforts to construct modern, 
formalised, individualist (Dumont, 1986) and legible (Scott, 2009) economies and societies. This 
is done both by colonising powers and by local elites who mint the concept of “corruption” in 
accordance with modern and colonial ideology to suit their purpose. Walter Mignolo posits that, 
“there is no modernity without coloniality”.14 We can add to this that there is no “corruption” in 
a legalistic sense without modern bureaucracy and, therefore, coloniality is a prerequisite to any 
notion of corruption that is defined according to a state law and not to local morality. Indeed, 
discourses of “corruption” that condemn “kinship”-type practices can be seen as constitutive 
of modernity and coloniality. If modernity is “a weapon of imperial/colonial global expansion of 
Western capitalism” (Mignolo, 2007, p. 165), then state-centric discourses of corruption serve as 
techniques by which this weapon is being used to establish and maintain power globally and 
locally, especially over marginalised populations with limited access to the formal systems and, 
therefore, heavy reliance on kinship- and community practices.
Recognizing the colonial and orientalist legacy as well as the political and economic interests 
behind the rise of the international anti-corruption industry since the 1990s helps us understand 
its heavy focus on the Global South and why the former Eastern bloc of “defeated enemies” and 
their nascent markets have garnered its special attention. As anthropologists and legal scholars 
writing on corruption rightly point out, the phenomenon itself is in no way limited to actors 
from the Global South (Cooley & Sharman, 2015; Haller & Shore, 2005; Werner, 2000). Quite to the 
contrary, the highest officeholders in Germany, France (Haller & Shore, 2005), the United States 
and the most esteemed companies in the Global North have repeatedly been involved in large-scale 
fraud, tax evasion, illegal campaign funding and other types of corruption. Manhattan and London 
are regarded as the world's largest off-shore tax havens and mainstream financial institutions like 
Deutsche Bank, Danske Bank, Nordea, Lehmann Brothers and Appelby's have been deeply involved 
11      Such explanations focus on deficiencies within the developing societies themselves in order to explain their problems 
rather than on outer factors like structural inequalities on a global scale. Lovell's call for social change in Central Asia to solve 
the problem of endemic corruption (2005, p. 70), quoted above, falls within this explanatory framework.
12      The latter has been described as a "purge" of indigenous elites (Critchlow, 1988, p. 142) entailing "practices akin to 
witch-hunting" (Werner, 2000, p. 20).
13      I use the term coloniality to go beyond the mere historical, european colonialism which it is tied to but supercedes as an 
ideological and power project – the " indispensable underside of modernity" (Tlostanova, 2012, p. 133).
14      Mignolo, 2011, p. 3, quoted in Kušić, Lottholz & Manolova, 2019, p. 13
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in money laundering and other financial fraud in the 21st century alone. Indeed, there is ample 
evidence that “Western companies (sometimes even backed by their governments) corrupt foreign 
officials to gain an advantage over their competitors” (Lovell, 2005, p. 66), and many corruption 
schemes in Central Asia are closely connected to “informal transnational networks” that “include 
multinational companies, elites in host countries, offshore financial vehicles and conduits, 
middlemen and brokers, and destination financial institutions” (Cooley & Sharman, 2015, p. 12), 
many of whom are based solidly in the Global North. Like many of the thousands of cases of tax 
evasion from European and North American countries leaked in the Panama Papers and Paradise 
Papers, these global networks “blur the line between illegal and legal activities” (12). They may 
be defendable as legal by a skilled lawyer but they are still morally highly reprehensible to most 
people outside the very exclusive circles of financial elites engaging in it.
A question of definition
This bias of the international anti-corruption industry against the Global South has become 
manifested in its definitions of corruption. The World Bank defines it as the “abuse of public office 
for private gain” (Polese, 2008, p. 51; Urinboyev & Svensson, 2013, p. 373). This definition has been 
widely adopted in slight variations since the 1990s. As Werner (2000), Lovell (2005) and others have 
pointed out, this definition entails several systematic prejudices:
First, the focus on “public office” to the exclusion of corruption in the private sector (Cooley & 
Sharman, 2015; Werner, 2000, p. 16) betrays a preoccupation with reforming state institutions and 
formalising local practice in the Global South to render it legible and manoeuvrable to Western 
companies (Werner, 2000). Transparency International recognises this shortcoming and defines 
corruption as "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (Transparency International, 2012 in 
Urinboyev & Svensson, 2013, p. 373). Entrusted power can be both that of the state and the private 
sector. 
Yet, there is a second prejudice that Transparency International does not address: The practices 
in Central Asia and other non-western contexts deemed corrupt by the state are rarely for purely 
private gain or advantage. Some definitions change “private” to “personal” to avoid the difficult 
debate around the distinction between private and public but even this is too narrow. As Werner 
(2000, p. 16) and Lovell (2005, p. 70) argue, such transgression of state law may be for the benefit 
of “one’s class or party, or friends or kin” or “out of a sense of loyalty, and without any personal 
gain involved.” Allowing for only the motivation of personal gain, stealthily introduces moral 
accusations of egotism and greed into the definition (Pardo, 2013, p. 140), where according to 
kinship-based notions of morality they would rather be motivated by loyalty, responsibility and 
dedication – just not to the state. The definitions thus entail a de facto moral condemnation of 
non-adherence to state laws. The anti-corruption industry shares this judgement with their above-
mentioned historical colonial precedents.
Third, this moral condemnation is expressed most clearly in the World Bank’s and Transparency 
International’s phrasing of corruption as “abuse”. Earlier popular definitions do not feature such 
strong moral language. In Leslie Palmer's definition from 1983, it is: “the use of the public function 
for a private advantage”15 and in 1967 Joseph Nye defines it as: “behavior which deviates from the 
formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique).”16 
When the large international organisations in the 1990s rephrased it as “abuse” or “misuse”, they 
tied a strong moral condemnation to a legalistically defined transgression against state law and 
bureaucracy. They thereby established as unquestionable the bureaucratic state perspective and 
universalised modern state laws as the primary sources of moral legitimation in stark disregard of 
the experience and sentiments of those large parts of the world population who depend on kinship 
institutions and experience exclusion from the centers of power and capital accumulation.
15      Palmer 1983, quoted in Polese 2008, 51.
16      Nye 1967, 419 quoted in Osipian 2009, 183.
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I have identified four main general phenomena that complicate the relation between what is 
illegal or legal and what is immoral or moral: 
1. Local people whose livelihoods depend on kinship and social networks give gifts and 
share office and resources in ways that are against the law but not viewed as wrong or 
immoral on the ground.
2. Underpaid professionals take bribes, which they consider wrong but excuse it as their 
only way to make ends meet and make the system function. 
These two can be considered defence mechanisms by the marginalised and exploited. They are 
illegal but morally accepted by most people locally. Anti-corruption measures can be used against 
them as a tool to control the marginalised and subdue them to those in power. Other “corrupt” 
practices consolidate the privileges of the wealthy and powerful to keep exploiting the poor and 
are thus corrupt in both a legal and moral sense, such as large scale money laundering and the 
sale of office or tenders. Lastly, some practices are deemed "corrupt" from a moral, but not from 
a legal perspective:
3. Large companies and powerful political actors find loopholes in the legal system to 
establish profitable deals that are not in the common interest and do not follow the spirit 
of the law but only its word. 
4. Ways to convert money into power or power into profit such as large donations to 
politicians’ campaigns, lobbyism, stock buy-backs, hedging and trading in sub-prime 
mortgage bonds that are viewed by large portions by the population as morally wrong 
but are legal according to the law. 
In recognition of such complications, Pardo distinguishes between moralistic and legalistic 
definitions of corruption (2013). The moralistic definitions match popular uses of the term and its 
etymological root in Latin meaning “moral decay, wicked behaviour, putridity, rottenness” (Osipian, 
2009, p. 183). Legalistic definitions precondition non-adherence to the law. Legal definitions are 
the easiest to assess, since they correspond to the state’s preferences and provide the de facto 
backbone of the entire anti-corruption industry. A gift to a superior or a certain favor to a relative 
that is illegal according to the law but not seen as immoral by local people should be termed 
“corruption” according to a legalist definition but not within a moralistic one. 
It is important to distinguish between two types of corruption, the extreme ideal-types of which 
are “nepotism” and “bribing.” Nepotism refers to giving advantages to specific persons because of 
existing or pursued long-term social relations. Bribing is the short-term purchase of an advantage 
that should not be purchasable according to the law. In a kinship-focussed morality as described 
above, nepotism is seen as legitimate, while bribing is not. Still, locally, bribing may also come 
to be seen as a legitimate reaction to a formal system that clearly does not deliver for those who 
have invested into it, and often these two types of corruption intermingle and interact in concrete 
practice.17
The double-bind of the marginalised
The generic concept of “corruption” as used in the anti-corruption industry entails a heavy 
state-bias that derives from its conflation of the legalistic and moralistic types of definition. This 
conflation leads to an unreflected universalisation of the bureaucratic logic of modern, capitalist 
laws as the yard-stick for ethical behavior and ignores or even demonises a kinship based morality 
and thus the perspective of millions of marginalised, excluded or exploited people globally. Such 
unwarranted universalisations have a centuries-long violent history in European colonisation, war 
and imperialism. The conflation of the legal and moral definitions of “corruption” follows this 
tradition to facilitate the term’s political misuse by local and global elites.
17      An instructive illustration of this is Johan Engevall's description of public office within the Kyrgyz state as being “ap-
proached as an investment object” from which returns are expected (2011, p. 24).
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If we shed the state-centric perspective and take seriously Van Schelden and Abraham's 
understanding of “the state as ‘just’ another form of modern political authority” among several, 
we could interpret the “entrusted power” that is being “abused for personal gain” in Transparency 
International’s above-cited definition of corruption as a power that can also be entrusted by the 
family, community or social network. Thus, those who do not share the resources to which they 
have access (including resources of the state and private companies) with their relatives would be 
said to misuse or abuse these powers given to them – especially as they continue to receive labour 
help on the fields, gifts at weddings, support for their children to find spouses and do not have the 
time to reciprocate in kind when working full time in the formal public or private sector.18 This can 
be seen as a kind of corruption from the perspective of kinship. In fact, choosing loyalty to social 
relations over loyalty to the law can be both a morally and rationally sound decision in contexts 
where people are highly dependent on social relations – especially on the margins of the economic 
world system hit by the crises and volatility of capitalism.
To do justice to these contexts, a legalistic definition of corruption should completely shed its 
default moral connotations. This doesn't imply that no practices legally defined as corruption 
are morally wrong – many of them are. It merely means that a deed cannot be judged morally 
wrong just because it is defined as “corruption” according to the law. Likewise, a purely moralistic 
definition of corruption must in consequence shed its dependence on the law altogether. To decide 
what is “corrupt” according to morality19 means paying no heed to what is legal or illegal. This 
would exclude various forms of illegal informal payments in Central Asia from the category of 
“corruption” while legal forms of tax evasion, election campaign financing, lobbyism, stock buy-
backs and other financial manipulation would clearly fall within it. To rid the concept of corruption 
of this analytical imprecision, its state-bias and its heavy potential for misuse by elites against 
marginalised populations, I strongly propose to always distinguish very clearly between legalistic 
notions of “corruption” and moralistic ones. This distinction should be carried out rigorously to 
the point of entirely dissolving the generic term “corruption” without further qualification.
In Kashgar and southern Kyrgyzstan, people from poorer, less educated backgrounds have a tendency 
to experience the formal economy and state bureaucracy as unpredictable and uncontrollable — as 
an area, where they lack ownership. Indeed, they are the first ones to suffer from fluctuations in 
the global or regional economies when markets drop or the rules are changed. To them, long-
term social relations provide paths around the discrimination and structural violence inherent 
in bureaucracy (Graeber, 2016, pp. 57-59) and cushion against the devastating effects of volatile 
markets. This gives them some control and ownership over their own livelihoods, but also brings 
upon them the suspicion of the state and formal organisations that condemn it as “corruption”, 
“nepotism” or “informality.”
Deep involvement in both the systems of bureaucracy and kinship with their conflicting loyalties 
takes skilful manoeuvring. Ömerjan, an Uyghur college teacher from Turpan, told me that after his 
father was promoted to a high position within the educational administration in his hometown, 
his mother would always keep a stock of expensive gifts in the house. When guests brought along 
gifts larger than expected, she was thus able to reciprocate before the guests left in order not 
to leave her husband indebted to them. This social indebtedness could, and indeed was often 
intended to, be used to ask favours of him that would compromise his duty of impartiality within 
the bureaucratic structures of his professional life. 
Ömerjan’s mother, the Uzbek midwife Umida, the low-level government clerk Rahmon described 
by Urinboyev and Svensson (2013), and many government officials are highly skilled in striking an 
effective balance in their investments and loyalties to each system. Others, like cadre or politicians 
convicted for corruption or like Jengesh, sinking into poverty and unemployment because they 
18      For a good example of this see the story of "pride of mahalla", a low-level official Rahmon who assisted the administering 
of "informal payments" to superiors and a high-level official Sardor who "was neither a good person nor a good state official 
due to his law-abiding behaviour and unwillingness to help mahalla people" (Urinboyev & Svensson, 2013, p. 378).
19     Here, of course, the question arises whose morality we are talking about, how to define it and how to determine or 
measure local notions of morality, but this is a separate philosophical and methodological task that must be discussed in more 
detail elsewhere.
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lack social relations, face the repercussions of either bureaucracy or kinship. Many become caught 
in conflicting loyalties and duties as the state legally regulates more than it effectively controls 
or is capable of provisioning. This thrusts people into a double-bind where the formal system 
does not provide sufficiently, but their attempts to self-organise and use the existing structures 
to compensate run the risk of being condemned as “corruption” and punished with fines or 
imprisonment. At the same time, if they adhere strictly to the state law they are likely to be 
accused of treason to the own group, “illoyalty” or “selfishness” and sanctioned with exclusion 
from networks that may be crucial to survival and household sustainability. 
Conclusion
Families in Xinjiang and Kyrgyzstan manoeuvre and balance their duties and loyalties to formal 
structures of state bureaucracy and formal markets on the one hand and those of kinship and 
community based on social relations on the other. They depend on both and may be punished 
severely by either system as adhering to one often means transgressing against the other. Because 
of the marginal position of the region in the capitalist world system, reliance on the formal systems 
has in the last decades repeatedly disappointed the expectations that motivated investments 
into them and is likely to continue to do so. Therefore, cultivating social relations –– even at the 
occasional cost of non-adherence to state laws –– is for many people both a rational and an ethically 
sound choice. This applies particularly to marginalised groups, like the ethnic minorities in XUAR 
or the poor in Kyrgyzstan. People from such groups who invest heavily into the formal systems 
and neglect their social networks, either as the result of state coercion or the lure of modernist 
propaganda and ideology, risk losing both relations and formal resources when markets change, 
financial crises hit or economic policy preferences follow new trends or dictates by the centers of 
power. In spite of being reasonable and morally justified choices, the prioritising of social relations 
over compliance to bureaucracy and law is condemned as “corruption” by government agencies 
and international organisations. This narrative is used by local power-holders to purge opposition 
and minorities and by western governments, companies and international organisations to shape 
the legal structures of the Global South in ways that make the local markets, labour and resources 
more easily accessible and exploitable. Both national and global power elites utilise discourses of 
“corruption” to legitimise and consolidate their own power and advance their economic interests. 
For this purpose, they promote a definition of “corruption” that follows state law and morally 
condemns transgression against it. This is used to morally denigrate action that does not follow the 
colonial modernisation policies of the power elite, including massive privatisation and austerity. 
Such a definition was coined and popularised by the World Bank and other large international 
organisations’ anti-corruption campaigns and rhetoric at the behest of western-led neo-liberal 
agendas in the 1990s. It reverberates in much of the international media’s and scholarly treatment 
of corruption until today. It has reiterated the orientalist stigmatisation of Central Asia and other 
marginalised global contexts as particularly corrupt, backwards and immoral, while forms of 
deceit and manipulation more typical of the Global North have been much more readily tolerated. 
Even more gravely, it deliberately furthers the erosion of local social systems of mutual support. 
As long as no solid, reliable formal structures can be guaranteed in these margins of the world 
capitalist system, such social relations are of essential importance to households’ livelihoods, 
social security and the general functioning of society. 
To seek not to reproduce the ideological conditions for misuse of the concept of “corruption” and 
its discourses and to salvage it as an analytical category, we need to deconstruct and oppose the 
global anti-corruption industry's definitions. The most severe problem in these is their conflation 
of legalistic and moralistic notions. Through this conflation state law and the logic of bureaucracy 
are elevated to universal ethics in disregard of the perspective, experience and life-worlds of 
marginalised peoples exploited and excluded by these formal systems. It is, therefore, crucial to 
rigidly distinguish between corruption in a legalistic sense and corruption in a moralistic sense. 
When defining an action as corruption in a legalistic sense, we must refrain entirely from moral 
judgement. Accordingly, when defining something as corruption in a moralistic sense, we must 
completely ignore the law to only base our judgement on local moral standards and an ethically 
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conscious understanding of the given socio-economic context within the capitalist world system. 
In a legalistic sense, certain gifts and favours are corruption but that does not necessarily mean 
that they are morally wrong. In a moralistic sense, they are not corruption at all, while it is 
corruption to use technically legal loopholes to keep savings in an overseas account with the aim 
of avoiding tax payments. Distinguishing between these two types of definitions of corruption 
does not mean dismissing either of them but simply serves as a reminder to not conflate them. 
By comparing and contrasting them, we identify a volume of legalistically defined corruption 
that is not also moralistically defined corruption. This is likely to point us to the regions and 
populations that suffer most from global market volatilities and existing legal structures based on 
their marginal position in the world economy. 
This distinction also points to a way forward politically. If we are to achieve a closer alignment 
of local moral judgement in Central Asia with the law and with international standards of good 
governance and best practice, it is not sufficient to campaign to change the attitudes of a given 
country's population or to reform laws and regulations. Aligning law and morality in Central 
Asia and elsewhere requires the establishment of a fair global economic system and a fair legal 
practice based on laws that take into account the situation and possibilities of those subjected to 
them and does not primarily serve the interest of global and national elites and special interest 
groups (Pardo, 2013). If we want to limit corruption in a legal sense, people must be given a good, 
sustainable incentive to choose the formal system. They can safely do this only if and when the 
formal system provides for them in a stable, reliable, sustainable and just way globally.
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